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Canada and the United States
Hyman opens by examining the rise of installment
credit in the 1920s and its impact on both consumers
and businesses. For consumers, this form of financing
offered an affordable path toward a solid middle-class
lifestyle, which in turn helped make being in debt more
socially acceptable. Manufacturers, in turn, relied on
credit to generate sales and finance retailer inventories
of expensive goods like cars, a process made easier by
forming a separate finance company. While banks were
not significant direct lenders to consumers because of
the risk involved, their role grew in the 1930s after participation in Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
lending programs gave them a glimpse of the profitability and potential of personal finance.
One of the stronger sections involves the transition
from installment credit (used to finance specific purchases) to revolving lines of credit that could be used
to pay for a variety of consumer goods. It began in the
1940s following the Federal Reserve’s enactment of
Regulation W, an anti-inflation measure that restricted
maturities on installment loans. To evade these rules,
retailers gave customers lines of credit with no preset
maturities as a way to finance goods normally paid for
on the installment plan. Consumers embraced this new
form of financing, because they appreciated the sense
of control they had over both how much they could borrow, and how they could use the credit. Large retailers
like department stores initially dominated the revolving
credit market, with banks becoming more involved after
improvements in technology led to the formation of the
VISA and MasterCard networks. By the end of the
1970s, the universally accepted, bank-issued credit card
was the dominant form of personal credit, and using
“plastic” to finance consumerism had become a broadly
accepted part of American life.
The rise of debt securitization is an example of how
public and private forces converged to shape the availability of consumer debt. In the early 1970s, the Federal
National Mortgage Association and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation began buying and selling
bonds backed by personal debt like mortgages, home
equity loans, and eventually credit card receivables.
This created a stable secondary market for consumer
loans and gave lenders the ability to raise capital directly from individual and institutional investors. The
result was billions in new funds for loans, and the entry
of new financial institutions into the consumer credit
business. None of this, however, would have been possible without improvements in technology and the sophisticated statistical models needed to analyze credit
risk, track consumer accounts, and structure the sale of
debt to investors. Unfortunately, the success of debt securitization became the core of the current financial crisis, as investor demand for these securities encouraged
banks to lend more to consumers so those debts could
in turn be securitized and sold.
Hyman is at his best when describing how necessity,
chance, and basic capitalism influenced how and why
businesses pursued different forms of non-mortgage
credit, and these insights provide a solid contribution to
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the literature. Similarly, his analysis of the shortcomings of computer-based credit evaluation systems, especially as they relate to financial discrimination, is also
compelling. However, the chapter on changes in mortgage lending practices, which emphasizes the role of the
FHA in shaping how Americans finance their homes, is
less persuasive. His conclusions would be better supported and more accurate if the key role traditional
home lenders played in this complex process had been
included. The work also would have benefitted from
greater use of statistical tables on the levels of consumer debt over time, the inclusion of which would enhance its value as a reference source. Such issues, however, do not diminish the merits of this book whose
readable overview of the history of personal debt in the
United States will be of value to scholars new to the
subject.
DAVID L. MASON
Georgia Gwinnett College
DAVID GARLAND. Peculiar Institution: America’s Death
Penalty in an Age of Abolition. Cambridge: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press. 2010. Pp. 417.
$35.00.
David Garland’s book poses this question: what explains the United States’ continued use of capital punishment in the face of a worldwide abolition movement? Garland approaches the question not as a debate
participant but as a detached sociologist (p. 7). His conclusion: American executions persist “because of the
structure of the American polity” (p. 310). “America’s
federated system,” he emphasizes, produces “state-bystate variation” (p. 160) with “local” control remaining
a dominant feature (p. 122).
The book is an impressive work of scholarship. It explains the death penalty’s demise in other Western
countries—and even in places like South Africa—as it
grapples with its persistence in the United States. It
gives a compelling account of the racial prejudice that
once spawned lynchings and that still plagues America’s
death penalty. It recounts how the U.S. Supreme Court,
in 1976, retreated from its 1972 decision in Furman v.
Georgia—the case that once declared U.S. death penalty laws, as then administered, unconstitutional (p.
206). And it persuasively explains how America’s death
penalty—now judged under the Court’s “evolving standards of decency” test—has itself evolved as American
society has changed.
Much of Garland’s analysis is spot on. Pointing to
lynch mobs in the Jim Crow South, Garland aptly argues that “local popular justice” (p. 32) has long been
an American tradition. While prosecutors and judges in
more centralized European states, he explains, are
mostly “tenured civil servants,” American prosecutors
and state court judges must run for office (p. 48). The
death penalty’s popularity, especially in the Deep
South, has thus made it difficult to outlaw executions
nationwide. Capital juries also contribute—as Garland
notes—to the death penalty’s staying power (p. 49), es-
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pecially since the Supreme Court allows “death-qualified” juries that systematically exclude death penalty
opponents. Only sixteen American states now outlaw
executions, though in many other states executions are
extremely rare.
The Supreme Court, Garland writes, has adopted a
rationalizing, democratizing, and localizing jurisprudence. The Court’s attempt to subject executions to legal rules—the “rationalizing” component—is rooted in
the Fourteenth Amendment. Its “democratizing” and
“localizing” jurisprudence is grounded in separationof-power principles, with much control ceded to state
legislators and the discretion of local prosecutors,
judges, and juries (p. 262). “If the Court were now to
declare the death penalty illegal,” Garland contends,
alluding to language in the Constitution contemplating
state-sanctioned killing, “it would have to set aside the
letter of the law and reverse all the relevant precedents”
(pp. 221–222). Yet, the Eighth Amendment—which
now bars executing the insane, juveniles, the mentally
retarded, and less culpable offenders—has itself, Garland acknowledges, already contributed to another
facet of the Court’s jurisprudence: a civilizing and humanizing one (p. 262).
Garland masterfully explains why executions still endure in the United States, but his suggestion that the
Constitution “limits the possibility” of capital punishment “being plausibly regarded as unconstitutional”
(pp. 187, 222) is contestable. The Eighth Amendment
unequivocally bars all “cruel and unusual punishments.” Although the Eighth Amendment originally
applied only to the national government, the Fourteenth Amendment made the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states. In guaranteeing “due process” and “equal
protection,” the Fourteenth Amendment transformed
American law, ensuring that the “cruel and unusual
punishments” prohibition would trump any offending
local practices. The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, in fact, currently require prison officials to protect inmates from harm, and corporal punishments
short of death have long been abandoned (p. 103) and
struck down as unconstitutional.
That executions should be declared unconstitutional
is supported by the facts that Garland so cogently presents. While mandatory death sentences for murder
were once the norm, they have disappeared (p. 260).
Death sentences are now discretionary and executions
take place predominantly in a few southern locales (p.
201). Executions—far crueler than corporal punishments—have thus become “unusual,” less common
even than being struck by lightning (p. 312). While
death sentences are still infrequently imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner, life-without-parole
sentences are now the standard—or usual—punishment for first-degree murder.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—referencing “capital” and “life” or “limb”—contemplated gruesome corporal punishments and the death penalty’s infliction (p. 221). Those provisions, however, were put in
place to protect individual rights when corporal pun-
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ishments and mandatory death sentences were still
prevalent. Indeed, the concept of judicial independence
requires the Supreme Court to decide the Eighth
Amendment’s meaning for itself. The Court’s continued deference to legislators (p. 275) and convictionprone “death-qualified” juries to gauge “evolving standards,” particularly in the face of sporadic,
discriminatory executions, actually contradicts that
principle and the Court’s own obligation to assess independently what is “cruel and unusual.” Ear cropping
and lopping off limbs are already part of a bygone era
(p. 145). A truly principled Eighth Amendment analysis
would bar executions, too.
Anyone wanting to understand America’s death penalty should read Garland’s superb book. But readers
should remember that the fate of death-row inmates
ultimately lies in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court.
JOHN D. BESSLER
University of Baltimore School of Law
ERIKA DOSS. Memorial Mania: Public Feeling in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2010. Pp.
xvii, 458. $25.00.
Americans are manic about memory. From temporary
roadside memorials to sprawling heritage corridors, the
commemorative impulse has grown so powerful as to
obscure who or what we hope to remember. This observation introduces Erika Doss’s survey of the nation’s
current mnemonic landscape and sustains it at a surprising clip over nearly four hundred pages. In what
may be the most penetrating contribution to American
memory studies since Kirk Savage’s Standing Soldiers,
Kneeling Slaves: Race, War, and Monument in Nineteenth-Century America (1997), Doss suggests that modern memorial culture is an index of our capacity for civil
discourse. That it is, by her account, is cause for real
concern.
Among the study’s most important contributions is
Doss’s contention that memorials function today as “archives of public affect” (p. 13). Some historians may be
unfamiliar with affect studies, which make significant
claims for the critical examination of feeling. The presumption is that feeling of any kind, whether it is happiness or shame, is socially constructed and therefore
worth interrogating for what it reveals about how and
why we interact with one another. By asserting that memorials embody affect, Doss expands her analytical
possibilities beyond categories like place, power, and
identity, which have become de rigueur in scholarship
concerning monuments.
Memorials, however, as Doss explains in her first
chapter, are not monuments, at least not insomuch as
we recall the statue mania that prevailed until early in
the last century. Commemorative genres like Savage’s
standing soldiers made essentialist claims about the
American past on behalf of a supposedly singular body
politic. By World War II, though, doubts about the feasibility of visually representing collective trauma triggered a commemorative frame shift. Minimalist public
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